What Bush Said: The War on Terror and the Rhetorical Situation
Ross Fitzpatrick

Much has been said and even more written about the nature of the rhetorical situation and its connection to the “real” world. Going back as far as the late 1960s and early 70s, scholars embedded within a variety of disciplines have debated about the nature of what Lloyd Bitzer coined in his 1968 article as “the rhetorical situation” (1). Bitzer argued that certain material conditions or events necessitate a “fitting response” to the specific situation (5). Within half a decade another prominent scholar in the field of rhetoric and composition, Richard Vatz, responded directly with “The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation.” In this aptly titled piece Vatz claimed there is never one “fitting response” to any situation and that “no situation can have a nature independent of the rhetoric with which he chooses to characterize it” (154). For Vatz, unlike Bitzer, “meaning is not discovered in situation, but created by rhetors” (157). The arguments forwarded by both Vatz and Bitzer have been carried through in academic circles within and without the field of rhetoric and composition.

Perhaps the greatest trend within all forums interested in dissecting and understanding the rhetorical situation has been its application to specific “real world” concepts and events. Over time, a contextual approach has overshadowed the theoretical approach established by Vatz, Bitzer, and others. For example, genre studies has incorporated the rhetorical situation as a scholarly artifact and investigated popular culture, new media, and politics through rhetorical analysis (Bazerman; Devitt; Miller). This seemingly interdisciplinary approach has, however, ignored other disciplines and theories highly embedded in the discussion of rhetoric and communication. The goal of this paper, then, is to introduce a specific theoretical lens through which one can evaluate the complexities of the rhetorical situation. Politics in many ways operates as a sort of rhetorical game, in which policy makers, analysts, and even citizen observers manipulate rhetoric to serve their own ideologies and justify their political agendas. Although rhetoric and composition, as a field, has had much to say about politics, it has had little to say about political theory. This analysis aims to combine Vatz and Bitzer’s discussion of the rhetorical situation with John Kingdon’s multiple-streams framework to understand the relationship between political speech and political action; maintaining the current trend towards contextual analysis while providing a new theoretical analysis based in political science.

Ideally my analysis will not only provide some isolated response to the early debate between Vatz and Bitzer but also bridge the fields of rhetoric and composition and public policy. Each field has much to contribute to the other in
In order to understand both why certain policies succeed and others fail, and to comprehend the power of rhetoric as a tool for change, this paper pulls from John Kingdon’s multiple-streams framework first introduced in his 1984 book *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, and a more modern analysis of this framework by Daniel Beland and Michael Howlett (Appendix A). Kingdon argues that three separate “streams” existed within politics that intersect to open “windows of opportunity” that result in political change (222). The first stream is the *problem stream* which “is filled with perceptions of problems that are seen as public in the sense that government action is needed to resolve them” (222). It is important here to emphasize the “public” nature of the problem, which filters how the government chooses to prioritize certain problems over others. The second is the *policy stream* which contains all of the potential measures the government could take to address the problem. And the last stream is the *politics stream* which includes the daily political climate including public opinion, legislative turnover, and advocacy by nongovernmental interest groups. When the three streams intersect, they open a *policy window* that can be exploited by a *policy entrepreneur*—an individual or a group of individuals—to set the agenda and enact policies (222). Here’s where the interesting part comes in (and what makes this theory uniquely relevant to a discussion of the rhetorical situation). Kingdon argues that these streams intersect due to certain “focusing events” that direct the attention of actors within all three streams towards a specific issue (222). This would suggest events determine rhetorical responses, but the presence of the policy entrepreneur within the framework contradictorily seems to align more with Vatz’s theorization that rhetoric determines action. Kingdon’s public policy framework then, seems particularly apt for combination with an analysis of the rhetorical situation.

In order to facilitate that combination, I have performed a rhetorical analysis of seventeen speeches delivered by President George W. Bush between September 11, 2001, to May 1, 2003. The text of all speeches, along with audio, is pulled from American Rhetoric, a database compiling transcriptions from many American presidencies. The goals of this analysis are twofold: to understand how Bush recognized the opening of a potential policy window and to understand the rhetorical strategies the President used to exploit those policy windows and determine the course of political action pursued during the first two years of the War on Terror. Unfortunately, the answers to the first question are not as clear as the answers to the second. There does not seem to be a clear correlation between specific military operations and international events prompting speech other than the obvious example of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. If there is no clear relationship between events and the prompting of speech, there does seem to be some relationship between speech and the development of policy and initiation of action. Through my own analysis of Bush’s speeches, supported by others’ previous secondary analysis, I have identified three major ways in which President Bush rhetorically manipulated the policymaking process and the opening of policy windows in the broader context of the War on Terror, and specifically in the context of the 2003 War in Iraq. First, by linking Iraq to
terrorist networks and Al-Qaeda, Bush framed the invasion of Iraq as an extension of the War on Terror. Second, by appealing to an American sense of identity grounded in the history of the Nation and a Christian American ideal, Bush used a perceived ideal “Americanness” to cut off democratic deliberation and limit the efficacy of opposing rhetoric. And lastly, by defining certain political speech as terrorism and by defining the response to 9/11 as a “War on Terror,” Bush determined not only what response was expected from Congresspeople and policymakers but also from the American public, which further strengthened Bush’s ability to control the decision-making process.

Perhaps one can imagine my theoretical approach as derived from the work of Vatz, Bitzer, and Kingdon, more in line with Jenny Edbauer’s more recent conceptualization of “rhetorical ecologies.” The point is not to confirm or deny the findings of any of the three, but to understand the rhetorical and material forces that contributed to the enactment of policy in a specific era. The sheer volume of speeches delivered demonstrates that there is no single exigence or audience, and therefore no singular rhetorical situation. However, there are certain rhetorical themes and tropes that tie those plural situations together. The aim of this theoretical frame is to account “for the amalgamations and transformations – the spread – of a given rhetoric within its wider ecology,” to understand what about Bush’s interpretation of events was conducive to its spread through policy making circles and the public writ large (Edbauer 20).

Methods: Rhetorical Analysis

In order to compile data for my analysis, I collected the transcripts of 31 speeches delivered by President Bush from September 11, 2001, to May 1, 2003. Of the 31 speeches analyzed, I identified 17 of them as having explicit references to either the attacks on September 11, the threat of terrorism as a whole, or the threat of Saddam Hussein in Iraq (Appendix B). I omitted speeches such as Bush’s “No Child Left Behind” signing address or the “Address on the 100th Anniversary of Cuban Independence” which included no such references. After compiling a list of these references, I identified three primary tactics used by the Administration to justify its approach to terrorism. The first being the projection of future scenarios, primarily evident in the connections drawn between Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and Al-Qaeda; either through explicitly blaming Iraq for supporting Al-Qaeda’s efforts or by discussing both threats in close proximity, creating a perceived linkage between terrorism and Saddam Hussein. The second tactic, the extrapolation of an American identity crisis, is evidenced through references to traditional American values such as freedom, religion, and rule of law, opposed to the values of both Iraq’s government and Al-Qaeda. And third, defining the Administration’s response to September 11 as a “War on Terror,” which includes the use of that particular phrase – or similarly militant language – in speeches.
I selected this particular date range because both September 11, 2001, and May 1, 2003, marked important milestones in the “War on Terror.” The attacks of September 11 prompted a massive military and legislative response from the American government which eventually escalated to the invasion of two Middle Eastern countries. May 1 marks Bush’s infamous “Mission Accomplished” speech in which he proclaimed an end to combat operations in Iraq. My analysis aims to both draw connections between delivery of a speech and initiation of military operations or policy enactment; and to identify the rhetorical tropes Bush used in order to manipulate the political setting.

Analysis/Results: Events Producing Speech

The events of September 11, 2001, undoubtedly changed the world. Terrorists later linked to the organization Al-Qaeda hijacked four airplanes and crashed two of them into the twin towers of the World Trade Center and one at the Pentagon. The fourth plane was misdirected by passengers aboard the flight and crash landed in a field in Pennsylvania. In total, 2,996 people were killed including passengers, first responders, and countless other innocent individuals. It was perhaps the greatest American tragedy since Pearl Harbor in 1941. And clearly, it necessitated a response from President Bush. The question is, was there only one “fitting response,” as claimed by Bitzer? That is, in this case, did events necessitate speech?

Bush delivered a total of three speeches on September 11, one at Emma Booker Elementary School, one at the Barksdale Air Force base, and a third at the oval office in a formal address to the nation (American Rhetoric).* The speeches were obviously a response to the events of that day, grieving for the loss of life and responding to those who committed the acts. However, other than this first example, a national tragedy, the conditions that necessitated speech are somewhat unclear. Most of the speeches delivered across the timespan analyzed seemed either erratically initiated or part of the regular functioning of the office – speeches like the annual State of the Union Address, regular press conferences, and military academy commencement speeches. However, this isn’t to say there was no exigence, but rather that the exigence is unclear and messy. For example, it is worth noting many of the speeches coincided with passed policies or new military initiatives, such as Bush’s speeches after the passage of the USA Patriot Act on October 26, 2001, or an address on operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19, 2003. In these rarer instances, the exigence seems relatively obvious: a new bill is passed into law. But these speeches were as much about rhetorically enacting these policies as they were responding to their passage or signing them into law. It is unclear whether any of the speeches analyzed were specific responses to individual military operations or strategically important events in Afghanistan or Iraq. Updates on the functioning of military operations were given in some of the speeches but in relatively little detail, with almost no references to specific skirmishes or combat zones.
Still, Bush delivered three speeches clearly necessitated by the passage of policy or development of military operations. First was a speech delivered on October 7, 2001, explaining Operation Enduring Freedom to the public. This was correlated with the initiation of air strikes on Al-Qaeda training camps and Taliban bases in Afghanistan. Two weeks earlier Bush had delivered a speech in an address to Congress making demands on the Taliban to give up Al-Qaeda leaders and vacate Afghanistan. As Bush explained during his address on Operation Enduring Freedom, “None of these demands were met. And now, the Taliban will pay a price.” In explaining the purpose of the operation Bush declared, “we defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear.” Here, as the name of the operation suggests, Bush rhetorically frames the military operation as an extension of freedom to the peoples of the world. In this way, Bush not only responds to the Taliban, but rhetorically initiates action by declaring the operation publicly and further cements a commitment to an ideal of freedom which softens the unsavory aspects of a military operation.

Similarly, but perhaps even more obviously, Bush rhetorically enacted the USA Patriot Act on October 26, 2001, by saying at the conclusion of his speech, “It is now my honor to sign into law the USA Patriot Act of 2001.” In this instance, Bush pairs the action of signing a bill with a verbal statement of passage. Bush rhetorically counters potential criticisms of the wide-reaching surveillance program throughout the speech, framing it specifically in the terms of counterterrorism, although many of the program’s provisions have been used in everyday criminal investigations. He says, “This bill met with an overwhelming -- overwhelming agreement in Congress, because it upholds and respects the civil liberties guaranteed by our Constitution.” And he frames the purpose of the law in morally absolutist terms, arguing “This legislation is essential not only to pursuing and punishing terrorists, but also preventing more atrocities in the hands of the evil ones.” And by referring to the United States as “a nation at war,” he justifies the bill as necessary to counter an imminent threat. And again, by naming the bill the “Patriot Act” the administration clothes the bill in nationalist framing which appeals to a sense of traditional American ideals. Throughout the speech, Bush doesn’t simply describe the provisions of the Patriot Act, but frames them in a certain context in order to emphasize its strengths and downplay criticisms.

Almost two years later, Bush delivered a speech on the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19th, 2003, coinciding with the beginning of troop deployment in Iraq. Here, Bush uses potential future scenarios to justify the bill and appeal to the same sense of morality present in the two previous examples. He declares, “We will pass through this time of peril and carry on the work of peace. We will defend our freedom. We will bring freedom to others and we will prevail.” Bush not only initiates military operations but frames their purpose and even predicts the outcome in order to justify intervention and assure the population that “decisive force” is the only possible solution. In line with Kingdon’s theory, Bush frames only one potential solution derived from the policy
stream. In rhetorical enactment, the president not only creates action but frames that action as the only one that could possibly be taken.

All this to say, Bitzer’s explanation of the rhetorical situation does have value, especially in relation to policy enactment. Rhetoric certainly plays a vital role in manipulating policy windows to produce action, but events are essential to the opening of those windows. Absent 9/11, there is no political justification for the War in Afghanistan, creation of a new cabinet position at the Department of Homeland Security, or massive increases in surveillance. No matter how one interprets Bush’s rhetoric on the War on Terror and its connection to policy, that rhetoric is at its core a response to that contingent event. What I will explore in the next section, however, is whether there is one single “fitting” response, or rather a multitude of responses that individuals choose to “fit” their own political agenda.

**Analysis/Results: Speech Producing Action**

*Role 1: Future Scenarios*

Unable to identify a clear and specific set of conditions necessitating speech, I move to the second dynamic: speeches creating the impetus for action; or in Kingdon’s terminology, opening policy windows. The first role of rhetoric in defining the Bush Administration’s public policy during the War on Terror and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is the rhetorical linkages the President made between those responsible for the 9/11 attacks and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. I identified this dynamic’s presence in 6 of the 17 speeches, with a notable increase in the leadup to the invasion of Iraq beginning in late 2002. By constructing future scenarios in which Iraq developed nuclear weapons and handed them to terrorists, Bush increases the threat of the regime and frames the War in Iraq as an extension of the War on Terror. Therefore, Bush manipulates the problem stream and the politics stream by exaggerating the extent or risk of the problem resulting in a priming effect that focuses the American populace’s attention on the threat of terrorism. And in kind, Bush manipulates the policy stream by claiming military intervention to be the only possible response to said problem.

As early as the First State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, Bush mentions the potential of a threat from Iraq in connection with terrorist activity. Bush infamously declared “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.” The rhetoric of the axis of evil intimately combined Iraq with Al-Qaeda, and posed them as a singular threat although the extent to which Iraq supported the group, or terrorism writ large, was unclear. In the same speech Bush says Iraq “could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred,” clearly projecting a potential future rather than describing the status quo. Amy Gershkoff and
Shana Kushner conducted a wide-reaching content analysis of the Bush Administration's rhetoric from 9/11 to the invasion of Iraq to determine the effect of such rhetoric on the American public's support for the War on Terror and the War in Iraq (Gershkoff and Kushner 525). Their evidence suggests that by connecting Saddam Hussein to Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden and frequently mentioning the two separate groups in the same speeches Bush created a good versus evil dichotomy that increased support for his agenda (Gershkoff and Kushner 525). This addition is important because it not only analyzes what Bush said, but demonstrates that his rhetoric worked. That is, it actively changed the public's attitude toward his Administration and its policies.

In October of 2002, Bush delivered a speech at a rally in Cincinnati dedicated exclusively to the threat posed by Iraq. Almost immediately, Bush connects Saddam to the events of 9/11 saying “On September the 11th, 2001, America felt its vulnerability—even to threats that gather on the other side of the earth. We resolved then, and we are resolved today, to confront every threat, from any source, that could bring sudden terror and suffering to America.” Using the language of “terror” loosely, Bush seems to define Iraq as a terrorist organization itself, specifically recalling the fresh memories of September 11. Bush also attempts to preempt potential criticisms of the action claiming, “Many Americans have raised legitimate questions: about the nature of the threat; about the urgency of action—why be concerned now; about the link between Iraq developing weapons of terror, and the wider war on terror.” Bush provides somewhat roundabout answers to these concerns by arguing that “Iraq and the Al-Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy—the United States of America” and that “Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists.” He also argues that “confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror.” Again we can see the rhetorical connections between terrorism in Iraq and the possibility of devastating action that requires preemption. Delivering an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein on March 17, 2003, Bush cuts off the possibility of diplomatic action when he delivers the line: “The security of the world requires disarming Saddam Hussein now.”

In each of these speeches Bush echoes the implications of his preemptive defense posture by “conflat[ing] present and future,” making potential threats seem more imminent, dangerous, and in need of immediate response (Dunmire 506). Just as discussed before, Bush rhetorically enacts policy by manipulating the decision calculus. Emphasizing the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction falling into the hands of terrorists, Bush downplays the potential negative consequences of failure and avoids a discussion of the likelihood of such a threat occurring. Bush scripts magnitude over probability which circumvents a discussion about the actual evidence of the regime’s possession of devastating military technology. Even after the fall of the regime in Iraq, no Weapons of Mass Destruction were found. This emphasizes the importance of Presidential rhetoric which in this case, clearly created a reality that did not exist.
Role 2: Identity Crisis

The second role rhetoric played in the time period analyzed is the construction of an American identity crisis which appealed to traditional Christian morality and the concept that “American” identity was under attack from external forces. Even in Bush’s first address to the Nation following the September 11 attacks Bush remarked “our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts.” Bush echoed this sentiment in 10 of the 17 speeches analyzed. In a speech on December 11, 2001, Bush declared “we will honor the memory of the 11th day by doing our duty as citizens of this great country, freedom's home and freedoms defender.” And in the Second State of the Union Address on January 28, 2003, defending his position on Iraq he told Congress “Whatever action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the American people.” This last line in particular demonstrates the effect of such rhetoric in cutting off the possibility of democratic deliberation concerning his Middle East policy. Framing efforts as a defense of freedom itself, Bush couches his policy in moralistic terms which deflects focus from concrete details of implementation. Again Bush frames the problem and politics streams by directing the public’s attention toward their “Americanness” and expanding the scope of the problem to a threat to the American way of life. Therefore, as Thomas Goodnight argues in his rhetorical analysis of Congressional debates surrounding the invasion of Iraq, rhetoric was an essential part of the actions the made the Iraq War a reality, and in fact outweighed more pragmatic or material calculations of reducing terrorism or the threat of use of WMDs (Goodnight 66). Bush used this strategy to supplement role 1 by not only exaggerating the material consequences of inaction but adding moral deterioration to the list of threats posed by terrorism and Iraq.

Not only does Bush frequently refer to traditional American systems of political value, but also religious morality and historical allegories. Bush ends nearly every speech analyzed with some variation of the phrase “God bless America” but also more explicitly ties decision making to Christian beliefs and attitudes. In the first address to the Nation he cites a Bible verse from the book of Psalms. Concluding the Second State of the Union Address Bush says “We Americans have faith in ourselves—but not in ourselves alone. We do not claim to know all the ways of Providence, yet we can trust in them, placing our confidence in the loving God behind all of life, and all of history.” As Denise Bostdorff argues, Bush invokes “the rhetoric of the covenant” which alludes to concepts of good and evil and a struggle to do the “right” thing (Bostdorff 312). This shapes political opinion over a specific issue by reframing and recontextualizing traditional tropes of American identity.

Similarly, Bush invokes the recent historical memory of events like the Cold War to spark nationalist fervor and limit deliberation in public spaces like the media. In his “The World Will Always Remember 9/11” speech, Bush remarks “Our
enemies have made the mistake that America's enemies always make. They saw liberty and thought they saw weakness. And now, they see defeat.” And at a commencement speech at the United States Military Academy Bush specifically echoes the ideological conflict of the Cold War by saying “In this way our struggle is similar to the Cold War. Now, as then, our enemies are totalitarians, holding a creed of power with no place for human dignity. Now, as then, they seek to impose a joyless conformity, to control every life and all of life.” Combined with frequent mentions of 9/11, this tactic adds another historical layer to what James Druckman and Justin Holmes define as the “presidential priming effect” (Druckman and Holmes 765). By focusing on specific aspects of identity, and connecting them to a single policy issue, Bush hopes to bolster support for his agenda and to deflect attention from areas where he may be underperforming, such as the economy.

Using these strategies Bush framed the War on Terror as a crisis of identity within the American public which limited the likelihood of well publicized dissent. Even within mainstream media, little arguments were forwarded against the invasion of Iraq, and only one Congressperson voted against the Authorization of Military Force against Iraq passed in October 2002 (Gershkoff and Kushner 529). This is not to suggest that there were no people forwarding arguments against the administration, as international backlash was fairly potent and there were protests within the United States. It does, however, suggest that those criticisms were not able to effectively counter Bush’s rhetoric of national identity. The lack of criticism once again suggests that Bush’s rhetoric was effective in creating contextual conditions to further his policies, as even traditional rivals within Congress acceded to his agenda.

**Role 3: Definition as A Political Act**

The final role rhetoric plays in creating material change is through the use of rhetorical definition as a political act, motivating support for one’s position while at the same time making it difficult to express dissent without appearing as sympathizing with the “enemy.” Terrorism in itself is political speech. It expresses a perceived grievance with some government or regime in hopes of intimidating them to change or simply to inspire others to cause havoc through violent means. And on the opposite side, defining a political act as terrorism delegitimizes that group and their grievance. In the context of the War in Iraq, we have already seen how Bush linked the Hussein regime to terrorists, thereby delegitimizing their authority to rule and justifying military action. But in addition, as alluded to in the first section of analysis, defining and naming your own political actions also has consequences. In choosing names like “The Patriot Act,” “Operation Enduring Freedom,” and “Operation Iraqi Freedom” the Bush Administration publicly defined their “goals” for military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and the implementation of an unprecedented surveillance and intelligence sharing program. Once again, this is an example of the rhetorical enactment of policy,
where not only does Bush’s speech reflect a sense of American Identity, but so does the policy itself.

Another defining—pun intended—act of the Administration was coining the phrase “War on Terror.” Bush first used this phrase during his address to Congress on September 20, 2001, saying “Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there.” When describing his political agenda, Bush frequently uses the phrase but also builds rhetorical militarism as a tactic within speech. Bush himself recognize the subtle inadequacy in using the phrase on its own. “Terror” is not a state, it does not possess a standing army, and it is impossible to understand as even one holistic group. All the same, in the First State of the Union Address he declares “we have a great opportunity during this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace.”

Defining an ongoing military operation in terms of a war and invoking a sense of martial law Bush determines not only what response is expected from Congresspeople, but the American populace writ large. Namely, as David Zarefsky argues: “national unity, quick response without debate or deliberation, rallying around the president, overt displays of patriotism and national pride” (Zarefsky 617). This framing of life and death, defeat and victory, helps justify unilateral presidential action and lessens the likelihood of dissent. Bush even makes direct appeals to citizens, repeatedly using the plural pronoun “we” and making remarks such as this one delivered over radio on September 15, 2001: “You will be asked for your patience -- for the conflict will not be short. You will be asked for resolve -- for the conflict will not be easy. You will be asked for your strength, because the course to victory may be long.” And echoed again during his first address to Congress when he says, “I ask for your patience, with the delays and inconveniences that may accompany tighter security; and for your patience in what will be a long struggle.” This strengthens the dynamic discussed in role 2 whereby democratic deliberation is rhetorically limited in the name of national security. Here Bush seems to create the rules for the rhetorical situation itself through definition, which delegitimizes what political speech is seen as relevant or acceptable.

**Conclusion**

Much can be said about Bush’s agenda and the efficacy or inefficacy of his politics. However, one must recognize his undoubtedly effective use of rhetoric. To return to the original debate between Vatz and Bitzer, it seems to some extent they were both correct. Clearly, the attacks of September 11 necessitated a rhetorical response from the Administration. However, rhetoric is what turned September 11, 2001, into 9/11. Rhetoric determined the long course of the War on Terror. Without 9/11, it is extremely unlikely Bush would have been able to effectively manipulate the three streams of public policy to open policy windows wide enough to sustain two major wars, the creation of a new cabinet level position in the Department of Homeland Security, and the development of comprehensive national security apparatus. But these windows were opened and
sustained by the use of rhetorical tropes which appealed to an American sense of identity, loss, and most prominently, fear. It can be seen that Bush’s rhetoric had a real effect on both public attitudes concerning the War in Iraq, and the War on Terror generally.

The connections between rhetoric and composition and public policy as academic disciplines provide new analytical frames and tools that can be used by scholars from both sides to craft more realistic, grounded, and accurate accounts of both specific “rhetorical situations” as well as the nature of the rhetorical situation and the development of policy as a whole. Combining public policy and rhetoric and composition deepens an understanding of the “rhetorical ecologies” through which speech circulates. Not only can individuals understand the processes that produce change, but also how those processes are forwarded by rhetorical choices. These connections have the potential to provide academics with the political knowledge and access necessary to forge real political change, even on a small scale; and gives political scientists access to new techniques to understand how and why policy is enacted. So that in sum, political thinkers, rhetoricians, and the public writ large have the ability to construct counter-rhetorics and pragmatic strategies that may help us avoid another Afghanistan, or another Iraq. As demonstrated in the context of the War on Terror, without an ability to effectively counter the rhetoric of the Administration, the media, Congress, and the public allowed Bush to take the steps he did. In hindsight, it is easy to see some of the potential disasters coming. But as they say, hindsight has a lot more data on state building.
Works Cited


Appendix A: Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework Graphic

Problem Stream:

Policy Stream:

Politics Stream:

Policy Window

Agenda

Policy Entrepreneur
# Appendix B: Table of Speeches and Rhetorical Roles Identified

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech</th>
<th>Role 1: Future Scenarios (Connections between Iraq and Al Qaeda/Threat from Saddam Hussein)</th>
<th>Role 2: Identity Crisis (References to traditional American values i.e. religion, freedom, etc.)</th>
<th>Role 3: Defining as a Political Act (References to the War on Terror or militarism)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/11/01 – Emma Booker Elementary</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11/01 – Address to the Nation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/14/01 – National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/15/01 – First Radio Address</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/20/01 – Address to Joint Session of Congress</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/7/01 – Operation Enduring Freedom Address</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/11/01 – News Conference on War on Terror</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/26/01 – PATRIOT Act Signing</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/29/02</td>
<td>First State of the Union Address</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/1/02</td>
<td>Military Academy Commencement</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/7/02</td>
<td>Address on the Threat of Iraq</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/28/03</td>
<td>Second State of the Union Address</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/26/03</td>
<td>Address on the Future of Iraq</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/17/03</td>
<td>Ultimatum to Saddam</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/19/03</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/1/03</td>
<td>Mission Accomplished Speech</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>